MICRO FICHE 3980
Keywords: Naval convoys, Sea control, World War I, World War II, Naval operations.
Abstract
This study was undertaken to determine why the "ancient practice of convoy" was not universally adopted until well into World War I and why it was not adopted sooner in World War II despite its proven success under modern conditions against the submarine version of the guerre de course in World War I. Primary sources used consisted of British Admiralty papers located in the Public Records Office, London, and United Sates Navy Department files in the Naval Historical Center and the National Archives in Washington, D.C., complemented by material from official histories, government documents, and the papers of relevant political and military leaders. These primary sources were supplemented by material from secondary sources, such as the memoirs of participants and related works by maritime scholars and other authors. This material was evaluated and synthesized by an individual who not only is a trained historian but also has the advantage of having had thirty-three years experience in the United States Navy. That experience encompassed, in part, eighteen years in the submarine service, including command of a snorkel boat; extensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exposure, including ASW barrier patrols as commanding officer of a submarine and duty on the staff of a Hunter-Killer Group (HUK GRP) as Submarine Liaison Officer; and several additional staff assignments, including duty as a member of the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., that involved politico-military decision making at the highest national level.
The major conclusions of the study are as follows -- since the last decade of the nineteenth century, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, United States Navy, has had more influence worldwide on the formulation of national policies and naval strategy in general and the protection of shipping in wartime in particular than any other individual in modern times. Specifically, his conclusions regarding the superiority of "capital ships," the decisiveness of "big battles," and the "irregular secondary...inconclusive...[and] indecisive" nature of commerce destroying have been accepted almost without question as the foundation upon which navies have been built and employed. Conversely, his strong support of convoying as being superior to hunting for marauders has been virtually ignored.
The first true test of Mahan's concepts of naval warfare came during World War I. Only one of his major conclusions, the superior efficacy of convoying, survived the ultimate trial by combat. In spite of her unique maritime commanding position to seaward of Europe and possession of a superior battle fleet, Great Britain was unable to achieve absolute military command of the sea as envisioned by Mahan. The supposedly decisive Battle of Jutland was indecisive. On the other hand, Great Britain and her Allies came close to losing the war as a result of the German submarine version of the guerre de course, a method of naval warfare characterized by Mahan as "secondary" and "indecisive" in nature. Only the belated adoption by the Allies of the "ancient practice of convoy" snatched victory from imminent defeat.
Despite this refutation under modern combat conditions of some of Mahan's most accepted "principles"--but vindication of his conclusion that convoy was the most effective measure against the guerre de course--the international community between wars continued to adhere to Mahan's "principles" and the illusion that the submarine version of the guerre de course could be outlawed by international proscriptions. As a result, on the eve of World War II the four most powerful naval antagonists in that conflict--Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan--had prepared for a naval war along the lines of a super-Jutland in accordance with the "principle" of Mahan that such a battle would be decisive of all issues, including the protection of the victor's merchant shipping.
The consequences of this unbounded faith in Mahan were that the depredations of German U-boats against the Allied sea lines of communication in the Atlantic once again came close to being the decisive factor in the war. And once again it was the belated adoption of the "ancient practice of convoy" that avoided disaster.
On the other hand, in the Pacific, mesmerized by the teachings of Mahan, Japan never did adopt an effective convoy system, or other measures, for the protection of her vital merchant shipping. As a result, the Japanese merchant marine was virtually annihilated, largely by American submarines, well before the atomic holocausts visited upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The magnitude of the success of the German submarine campaigns against Allied shipping in World War I and World War II and the virtual annihilation of the Japanese merchant marine in the latter war provide proof that Mahan's conclusion regarding the "secondary" and "inconclusive" nature of a war on shipping is no longer valid--if ever. In a modern, industrial, logistics-dependent world, the destruction of merchant shipping--as opposed to commerce destroying--has become a primary and potentially decisive method of naval warfare.
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that so far this century Mahan's influence on national policies and naval strategy has had a decidedly negative effect on measures adopted for the protection of shipping in wartime.
October 3, 2007
